Functional Regulation: Looking Ahead by Peters, Aulana L. & Powers, David N.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
9-1-1985
Functional Regulation: Looking Ahead
Aulana L. Peters
David N. Powers
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation





and David N. Powers***
I. INTRODUCTION
During the last five years, financial institutions have crossed indus-
try lines more and more frequently. As a result, securities firms, com-
modities merchants, banks, thrifts and insurance companies are offering
products that are functionally indistinguishable from one another. Fur-
thermore, through mergers and acquisitions, firms are increasingly offer-
ing a full range of financial services that span all these industries.
Nevertheless, regulation of these multi-faceted firms is generally deter-
mined by what they are called, rather than by the type of commercial
activity in which they engage. Consequently, the same type of commer-
cial activity is presently regulated quite differently, depending upon the
"type" of firm engaging in that activity. This disparate treatment has
been noted by many commentators, who have recommended various so-
lutions.1 Most recently, the Task Group on Regulation of Financial
Services (the Bush Task Force) published its Blueprint for Reform2
which highlights certain instances of inequitable and inefficient regula-
* The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent
those of the Commission, other Commissioners or the staff of the Commission. The authors
express their sincere thanks to Alan Rosenblat, Assistant General Counsel, and Coleen C.
Harvey, Deputy Chief Counsel, Division of Market Regulation of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, for their insightful comments to drafts of this Article. Ultimate responsibility for
the contents of this Article, of course, lies with the authors.
** Commissioner, United States Securities and Exchange Commission; B.A., 1963, Col-
lege of Rochelle; J.D., 1973, University of Southern California.
*** Counsel to the Commissioner, United States Securities and Exchange Commission;
A.B., 1978, Princeton University; J.D., 1982, University of Virginia School of Law.
1. See, ag., Pitt & Williams, The Convergence of Commercial and Investment Banking:
New Directions in the Financial Services Industry, 5 . CoMP. Bus. & CAPITAL MARKET L.
137 (1983); Karmel, Glass-Steagal- Some Critical Reflections, 98 BANKING LJ. 631 (1980);
Note, Commercial Law-Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System v. Investment
Company Institute: The Continuing Conflict Between Commercial and Investment Banking, 61
N.C.L. REv. 378 (1982-83); Homogenization of Financial Institutions: The Legislative and
Regulatory Response, 38 Bus. LAW. 241 (1982); Note, A Banker's Adventures in Brokerland:
Looking Through Glass-Steagall at Discount Brokerage Services, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1498 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Note, A Banker's Adventure].
2. TASK GROUP ON REGULATION OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM
(July 1984) [hereinafter cited as BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM].
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tion of financial services companies, especially with respect to the differ-
ent treatment of banks and broker-dealers.
The approach that has been adopted by the Bush Task Force and
others to simplify and rationalize the existing regulatory framework has
been labeled "functional regulation." The concept of "functional regula-
tion," simply put, would require that the activities of commercial entities
performing essentially the same services and selling the same products be
subject to the same regulatory framework.3 Thus, under the theory of
functional regulation, a bank or an insurance company rendering the
same services in connection with securities as a broker-dealer should be
subject to the same rules and regulations administered by the same
agency. The theory of functional regulation is virtually universally sup-
ported, especially within the administration.' As a result of this broad
support, the Bush Task Force has made several recommendations which,
if adopted, would eliminate some of the current disparities in the regula-
tory framework.' Moreover, federal agencies such as the Department of
the Treasury, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or the
Commission), the Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC) and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) have proposed legisla-
tion or rules that would also eliminate existing disparities. Perhaps most
prominent among these is legislation proposed by the Treasury Depart-
ment that would require banks conducting certain securities activities to
do so through affiliates as part of a holding company structure.'
Most of the discussion of functional regulation has taken place in
the context of expanded bank activities.7 An understanding of the con-
cept of functional regulation requires some discussion of the activities of
banks and broker-dealers and the regulations applicable to them. There-
fore, this Article will trace briefly the development of the current regula-
tory framework of "industry regulation" and the disparities and
inefficiencies that that framework has produced. As the footnotes to this
Article indicate, however, tracing the developments of the present regu-
latory framework and pointing out its disparities is a job that has been
3. Letter from Donald T. Regan, Secretary of the Treasury, to John S.R. Shad, Chairman
of the SEC (July 12, 1984) (commenting on the SEC's proposed Rule 3b-9).
4. See Comment letters to the SEC's proposed Rule 3b-9.
5. The recommendations were unanimously endorsed by the members of the Bush Task
Force. See BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM, supra note 2, at 2 (report transmittal letter). However,
most of the recommendations concerned overlapping regulation of banks and thrifts not
overlappng and inefficient securities regulation. This Article will not discuss the recommenda-
tions of the Bush Task Force that do not relate to securities regulation.
6. See infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
7. See, eg., supra note 1.
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done quite well by other commentators. The real point of this Article is
that through the Treasury Department's proposed holding company re-
quirements for financial services firms, functional regulation can be a
"blueprint" for much more than the resolution of a jurisdictional dispute
between the banking and securities industries and their regulators. Func-
tional regulation offers a guide for efficient cooperative regulation among
federal and state agencies, and among state agencies themselves. For ex-
ample, the regulation of insurance products, many of which have large
investment components' is one area where significant benefits may be
gained from functional regulation. Finally, with the possibilities for elec-
tronic and telephonic filing of reports just now becoming apparent, the
efficiencies to be realized by applying the concept of functional regulation
beyond the context of banking and securities regulation may be greater
than anyone has realized.
II. THE GROWTH OF INDUSTRY REGULATION
During the 1930's and continuing into the 1970's, Congress estab-
lished a regulatory system for the financial services industry based on
industry lines. Banks were regulated by banking agencies, broker-dealers
by state and federal securities agencies, and federal savings and loan as-
sociations and federal savings banks (hereinafter referred to as thrifts) by
thrift agencies. Regulation of insurance companies was left to the states.
This section will briefly review the creation of some of those agencies,
and consider the congressional rationale for this regulatory framework.
Prior to 1929, national banks had securities affiliates which were
quite influential in the investment banking business. They were regulated
by the OCC and, to the extent they were members of the Federal Reserve
System, by the Federal Reserve Board (FRB). The stock market crash
and the Depression caused the failure of hundreds of banks and securities
firms. Congress placed much of the blame for the collapse of the nation's
financial system on the securities activities of banks.9
8. See SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967); SEC v. Variable Annuity
Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959); SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-6558 (Nov. 21, 1984)
(concerning proposed Rule 151 which would create a "safe harbor" for certain annuity con-
tracts within § 3(a)(8) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(8) (1982)).
9. Pitt and Williams note that:
[H]earings held by Senator Carter Glass revealed a range of activities undertaken by
bank securities affiliates which adversely affected the safety and soundness of the
parent banks. These abuses included:
[1] borrowing money from parent banks on concessionary terms;
[2] repurchase agreements between banks and affiliates designed to avoid lending
limits;
[3] trading upon the public identification between affiliates and parent banks;
1985] 1077
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One congressional response to this problem was the passage of the
Banking Act of 1933, ' 0 popularly known as the Glass-Steagall Act. Con-
gress intended the Glass-Steagall Act to tighten federal regulation of the
banking industry, to restore public confidence in the nation's banks and
to prevent another banking crisis. Thus, the Glass-Steagall Act re-
stricted, but did not eliminate, the involvement of national banks11 in
securities activities and prohibited securities firms from accepting depos-
its. 2 The FRB and the OCC were charged with administering the Glass-
Steagall Act, including the provisions related to securities activities.
1 3
In the aftermath of the Crash, Congress also created a separate reg-
ulatory framework for thrifts. Pursuant to the Home Owners' Loan Act
of 1933,14 the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) was estab-
[4] "dumping" of undesirable securities on parent banks by the affiliates;
[5] loans by parent banks to customers for the purpose of purchasing securities
offered for sale by affiliates;
[6] unsound shifting of assets between parent banks and the affiliates; and
[7] the assumption of questionable risks by affiliates that were impermissible for the
parent banks.
Pitts & Williams, supra note I, at 139 (footnote omitted).
10. Ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). The
Banking Act of 1933 also created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Ch. 89, § 8, 48
Stat. 162, 168 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1831 (1982)). Pursuant to its dele-
gated authority, the FDIC requires insured banks, which today include virtually all national
and state banks, to obtain its prior written consent before changing the general character of
their business. It is not clear whether this regulation gives the FDIC veto power over the
securities activities of insured banks. For a brief description of the state of the law in this area,
see Pitt & Williams, supra note 1, at 150 & an. 80-81.
11. National banks are federally chartered banks, 12 U.S.C. § 21 (1982), whose trust activ-
ities are now regulated by the Comptroller of the Currency, 21 U.S.C. § 92(a) (1982). Na-
tional banks are also required to become members of the Federal Reserve System. 12 U.S.C.
§ 282 (1982).
12. The three sections of the Act through which this separation was effected were §§ 16,
20, and 21. Section 16 prohibited national banks from dealing in securities except for buying
or selling securities and stock "without recourse, solely upon the order, and for the account of,
customers." Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 16, 48 Stat. 162, 184. At one time, it was thought
that this language required a bank to have a relationship with a customer independent of
securities before customer orders could be executed. See 1 BULLETIN OF THlE COMPTROLLER
OF THE CuRRENCy No. 2, at 2 (Oct. 26, 1936). Section 16 also expressly prohibited national
banks from underwriting securities or stock, but authorized national banks to purchase certain
investment securities for their own accounts, subject to certain limitations. Banking Act of
1933, ch. 89, § 16, 48 Stat. 162, 184-85. Section 20 prohibited the securities affiliate system, id.
§ 20, 48 Stat. at 188, and § 21 prohibited underwriters from accepting deposits, id. § 21, 48
Stat. at 189.
13. One widely held opinion is that bank regulators have sought to achieve these goals by
"discreet regulation." See Note, 4 Banker's Adventure, supra note 1, at 1529 & n.148. The
fear of bank runs has led bank regulators to protect depositors by assuring the stability of the
banking system and the solvency of the individual bank through behind-the-scenes persuasion
and coercion. Id. at 1529-30.
14. Ch. 64, 48 Stat. 128 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1470 (1982)).
lished to provide for the incorporation, organization and chartering of
thrifts. 5 The disclosure, reporting and proxy requirements of thrifts
under the Securities Exchange Act of 193416 (1934 Act) are administered
by the FHLBB, not by the SEC. Nevertheless, the SEC has jurisdiction
over the disclosure, reporting and proxy requirements of publicly held
thrift holding companies, even if the only asset of that holding company
is the stock of a thrift.
The Securities Act of 193311 (1933 Act), the 1934 Act, the Invest-
ment Advisers Act of 194018 (Investment Advisors Act) and the Invest-
ment Company Act of 194019 (Investment Company Act) created a
separate system of regulation for the securities industry. Members of
that industry, broker-dealers, investment advisers and investment com-
panies,2" as well as issuers, are required to register with the SEC and are
subject to complex disclosure, reporting and record-keeping require-
ments. In addition, industry members are subject to the anti-fraud provi-
sions of the securities laws, which are designed to protect investors and
to insure fair and orderly markets.
Notwithstanding their involvement, although limited, in securities
activities, banks have been expressly excluded from the definitions of
"broker" and "dealer" under the 1934 Act,2 ' thus exempting them from
the requirements to register, and be regulated as "broker-dealers."
Moreover, securities issued by banks and thrifts are exempt from regis-
tration under the 1933 Act,22 and bank common trust funds and tax-
qualified pension accounts are excluded from the definition of an invest-
ment company. Thus, these securities are exempt from regulation under
15. In 1934, Congress passed the National Housing Act, ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.), which created the Federal Savings
and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC). The FSLIC now insures accounts at not only fed-
eral but also state thrifts. Insured thrifts must submit an acceptance business plan to the
FSLIC, and the FSLIC may hold hearings and issue cease-and-desist orders if an insured thrift
is engaging, has engaged or is about to engage in an unsafe or unsound practice.
16. Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982)).
17. Ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982)).
18. Ch. 686, 54 Stat. 847 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1-80b-21 (1982)).
19. Ch. 686, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1-80a-64 (1982)).
20. The history of securities regulation by the SEC is generally not described as "discreet,
cooperative and nonadversarial." See, eg., R. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECuTION
(1982). Instead, the SEC has utilized its access to the courts to curb unethical practices. This
difference in style has been to some extent a function of the differing mandates of the securities
and bank regulators. While the bank regulators have protected depositors by preserving the
stability of the banking system, and thus, in some cases by shielding depositors from bad news,
the SEC has sought to protect investors by insisting upon complete and accurate disclosure
and by insuring fair and orderly markets through litigious regulation of unethical practices.
21. Sections 3(a)(4) and (5) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(4)-(a)(5) (1982).
22. Section 3(a)(5) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77(c)(a)(5) (1982).
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the Investment Company Act.2 3
Similarly, the SEC has limited jurisdiction over insurance compa-
nies and insurance contracts. Section 3(a)(8) of the 1933 Act exempts
from its registration requirements any insurance policy or annuity con-
tract which is subject to the supervision of a state insurance commis-
sioner.24 This exemption has been construed, however, to exempt
insurance products from all requirements of the 1933 Act.25 Moreover,
the SEC has long taken the position that traditional insurance products
are not securities within the meaning of any of the statutes it adminis-
ters.26 Thus, most insurance products and the sales practices used in
connection with them are regulated not by the SEC at all, but by the
states.
One may reasonably ask what the congressional intent was in the
1930's when this framework of regulation by industry was established.
Of course, there is no legislative history concerning the passage of all
these statutes and the formation of the various financial services agencies.
Nevertheless, the legislative history that exists suggests that the congres-
sional perception in the 1930's was of a world in which banks, broker-
dealers, thrifts and insurance companies would not compete outside their
industry. Thus, it made some sense to create separate agencies and sepa-
rate -laws that were specialized for a particular industry. For example,
although the legislative history of sections 3(a)(5) and 3(a)(6) of the 1934
Act is not extensive, the legislative history of previous bills includes refer-
ences to the limited securities activities of banks.27 Similarly, the exclu-
sions in section 3(a)(8) for insurance products seems to have been based
on the belief that "traditional" life insurance polices and annuities28 did
not compete with traditional investments and thus did not raise the con-
cerns that led to passage of the securities laws.29
Congress' apparent faith in the "regulation by industry" approach
23. Section 3(c)(3) of the Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(3) (1982).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 77(c)(a)(8) (1982).
25. See L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 214 & n.3 (1983).
26. Id.
27. See Stock Exchange Regulation: Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the
House Comm on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 85-86, 686-87 (1934)
(statement of Thomas G. Corcoran, counsel with the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and
a principal drafter of the 1934 Act provisions regarding the limited nature of bank securities
activities); Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Cur-
rency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6470-71 (1934) (statement of Thomas G. Corcoran).
28. "Traditional" annuities mean annuities in which the insurer guarantees the principal
and a fixed rate of return for the life of the contract.




continued until as late as 1974, when the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) was established.3" The CFTC administers a com-
prehensive and separate regulatory system for all future contracts, op-
tions on futures and options on commodities. Commodities and
derivative products on commodities, such as options and futures, are not
securities and thus their issuance and sale are not regulated by the SEC.
Nevertheless, as will be noted later, the line between commodities and
securities in the area of derivative products is anything but bright.
Since the 1930's, firms from different industries within the financial
world have competed increasingly across industry lines. The pace of this
phenomenon has accelerated dramatically in the last ten years. As a re-
sult, the financial services industry is far different in the 1980's than it
was in the 1930's. The present regulatory framework, which was
designed for the 1930's financial world, is in many respects inefficient and
inequitable.
III. BREAKDOWN OF INDUSTRY LiNEs
Not long after the regulatory framework described in section II was
established, industry lines separating banks, thrifts, insurance companies
and securities firms began to break down. Banks were the first to expand
aggressively their securities activities, but the 1950's arrived to find insur-
ance companies also in the securities business through the marketing of
variable annuities. By the late 1970's and early 1980's, all industry lines
were faint, if they remained at all, as securities firms engaged in activities
that closely resembled banking, and firms from all sectors were being
merged into single "full service" corporate entities.
As noted previously, banks were not totally prohibited from engag-
ing in the securities business by the Glass-Steagall Act. In fact, shortly
after its passage, banks began to expand their activities to include mar-
keting products and services functionally indistinguishable from those
regulated by the SEC. For example, in 1937, the FRB amended Regula-
tion F under the Glass-Steagall Act, which prohibited national banks
from commingling trust funds, to allow national banks to establish com-
mon trust funds comprised of assets of individual trusts that they admin-
istered. In 1940, the FRB authorized national banks to use common
trust funds only for the investment of funds held for "true fiduciary pur-
30. Pub. L. No. 93-463, § 101, 88 Stat. 1389 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 4a (1982)).
Indeed, if the first congressional act correcting the disparities caused by industry regulation is
the measure for congressional perception of its viability, then perhaps Congress perceived that
industry regulation was viable until 1982, when the CFTC/SEC accord was passed. See infra
note 45.
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poses.""1 The FRB also concluded that although banks could not solicit
the public to invest in common trust funds, they could advertise gener-
ally the availability of their services.32 Common trust funds, of course,
technically are investment companies, as that term is defined in the In-
vestment Company Act, and would have been regulated as such but for
the statutory exclusion of common trust funds from the definition of in-
vestment company in section 3(c)(3) of the Investment Company Act.
Therefore, as early as 1937, banks were engaged in commercial activities
functionally indistinguishable from the business of investment compa-
nies; nevertheless, these activities were subject to vastly different rules.
The advent of common trust funds merely foreshadowed the current
state of affairs.
During the 1950's, tax-qualified employee benefit plans came into
vogue. The FRB authorized their use by banks in 1955, and the SEC
interpreted section 3(c)(13) (now section 3(c)(1 1))33 of the Investment
Company Act as not requiring registration of collective investment funds
as investment companies.3 The theory of these exclusions was that
banking regulation obviated the need for SEC regulation,35 even though
bank regulation was far different from SEC regulation.
Bank brokerage activities have also expanded since 1934. Banks
always have administered dividend reinvestment and employee stock
purchase plans and have forwarded customer orders to buy or sell a se-
curity to a broker-dealer for execution. The latter was merely an "ac-
commodation service" and thus was not inconsistent with the exclusion
of banks from the broker-dealer registration requirements of the 1934
Act. When brokerage commission rates were fixed, the bank typically
received a small service charge and the broker received the fixed commis-
sion. Today, this service, in the form of "discount brokerage," is aggres-
sively marketed,36 and the bank receives a portion of the commission to
31. 26 Fed. Res. Bull. 393 (1940).
32. 42 Fed. Res. Bull. 228 (1956).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(11) (1982).
34. 1 T. FRANKEL, THE REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS § 10.2 (1983).
35. Cf. H.R. REP. No. 1382, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1970) (The committee reasoned that
the exemption is intended to grant banks and insurance companies, whose separate accounts
are exempt under § 3(b)(5), equal treatment under the federal securities laws. Bank collective
trust funds are not exempt if they are used as a vehicle for direct investment by the public.).
36. Examples of banks with internal discount brokerage services that have publicly solic-
ited brokerage customers include: Wachovia Bank & Trust (newspaper advertisement states
"When you follow your own advice in buying and selling securities, you can trade through
Wachovia and save up to 60% or more on commissions," Charlotte Observer, Dec. 26, 1983);
and Commerce Banks (newspaper advertisement states: Trade your Broker for your Banker,"
St. Louis Bus. J., Nov. 7-13, 1983, at 48).
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be paid by the customer. Bank employees involved in discount brokerage
increasingly handle customer orders, funds and securities. Finally,
although banks still do not provide investment advice or recommenda-
tions directly, many are distributing third party advice as part of their
service to the investing public. 37 Moreover, some are contemplating offer-
ing advisory services directly. 38 As a result, banks today are competing
directly with traditional broker-dealers for the securities business of the
public investor.
Banks have not been the only firms that have moved beyond the
range of financial service activities Congress envisioned for them in the
1930's. During the period of sustained high inflation of the 1970's and
early 1980's, money market mutual funds competed quite successfully
with passbook savings accounts, which were limited by law in the interest
they could pay. The well documented phenomenon of disintermediation
resulted, and certain banks and thrifts, especially small and medium
sized institutions, found themselves with loan portfolios at low fixed rates
and only very limited sources of funds at passbook rates. As a result,
during the 1980's, the "interest rate spread ' 39 of these financial institu-
tions was often negative, and, needless to say, they were rapidly losing
money. In response to this phenomenon, banks and thrifts were given
the authority to offer money market type accounts4° to compete with
money markei mutual funds. On the other side of the crumbling fence,
securities firms have offered check writing privileges in connection with
their money market accounts. Many also offer VISA debit cards.
Money market mutual funds with check writing privileges are regulated
37. See American Nat'l Bank of Austin, Texas [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] FED. BANK-
ING L. REP. (CCH) 99,732 (Sept. 23, 1983) (the OCC permitted American National Bank of
Austin, Texas, to establish a subsidiary to provide investment advisory services). According to
recent articles in the Wall Street Letter, banks around the country are relying on the OCC's
decision and are beginning to provide what the banks assert is third party investment advice in
addition to the discount brokerage which they are presently providing. See Banks Join Rush to
Offer Third Party Investment Advice, WALL ST. LETTER, Sept. 10, 1984, at 2 ("Banks are
distributing advice from Value Line in the form of the well-known Value Line Investment
Survey as well as from Standard and Poor's, which sends it advice into computer screens in the
banks.").
38. Recent news articles indicate that many banks are contemplating a variety of invest-
ment advisory activities. See First Chicago Prepares to Offer Investment Advice to Retail Cus-
tomers, WALL ST. LETTER, Aug. 20, 1984, at 1, 9; Arkansas Banks Hire Stockbrokers, WALL
ST. LETTER, Aug. 27, 1984, at 1, 10.
39. The principal factor affecting the profitability of a financial institution is its "interest
rate spread," which is the difference between yields earned by the financial institution on its
loan and investment portfolios and the rates of interest paid by the financial institution for its
deposits and borrowings. Obviously, a higher interest rate spread will produce greater profits.
40. Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, 12 U.S.C. § 3503(c) (1982).
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by the SEC. Bank money market accounts are regulated by banking
agencies.
Diversification of activities in this area has not been limited to banks
and securities firms. Insurance companies also have devised investment
products for their customers that were unimagined when the securities
laws were enacted. During the 1950's, insurance companies began to
market variable annuities as an investment offering the investor protec-
tion from inflation. 1 This hybrid instrument of investment and insur-
ance raised the question of whether variable annuities were intended to
be excluded from the federal securities laws.
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's holding in SEC v. Variable
Annuity Life Insurance Co.,42 that variable annuities are not excluded
from the reach of the securities laws,43 the SEC has proposed for com-
ment Rule 151 under the 1933 Act," which would provide a safe harbor
for annuities within Section 3(a)(8). The exclusion from the federal se-
curities laws would encompass even those annuities that impose a sub-
stantial investment risk on the purchaser, as long as the corporation
offering the annuity is subject to regulation by state insurance officials,
the annuity is not marketed primarily as an investment and several other
criteria are met. If the proposed rule is adopted, annuities meeting these
conditions would not be subject to SEC regulation, but would be regu-
lated exclusively by the states. Ironically, the SEC has proposed a rule
that would provide for state regulation of an instrument that is clearly a
security since it places substantial investment risk on the purchaser.
Thus, the SEC has perhaps reinforced the framework of regulation along
industry lines.
Disparate regulation also creates anomalous situations in the com-
modities area. During the last few years, commodities exchanges regu-
lated by the CFTC have offered for trading futures on stock market
indices. More recently, stock and options exchanges regulated by the
SEC have offered for trading options on stock market indices. These
instruments are functionally indistinguishable but are subject to the sig-
41. For a brief description of the development of the variable annuity and similar instru-
ments, see L. Loss, supra note 25, at 215.
42. 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
43. Id. at 67-68, 73. The Court emphasized that the issue of whether a variable annuity is
exempt from the securities laws is a federal question. In holding that variable annuities are not
excluded from the reach of the securities laws, the Supreme Court reasoned that in traditional
insurance policies and annuities the insurance company takes the investment risk. Variable
annuities, on the other hand, place substantial investment risk on the annuitant and thus are
subject to federal securities laws.
44. SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-6558 (Nov. 21, 1984) (Commissioner Peters dis-
sented from the Commission's decision to authorize release of the proposed rule).
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nificantly different jurisdictions of the CFTC and the SEC.4"
In sum, as Chairman Shad of the SEC has observed: [T]he fi-
nancial world is entirely different from the way it was when the
present regulatory structure was created. Today, the securities
industry is selling money market funds offering check-writing
privileges, banks are selling insurance; insurance companies,
credit card companies and a major retailer of consumer goods
are acquiring broker-dealers; savings and loan associations are
being acquired by steel companies; and the general proliferation
of new products and new combinations of formerly distinct fi-
nancial entities is proceeding at a pace that is unprecedented in
our economic history.4
IV. DISPARITIES IN THE FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK
With so many statutes affecting so many agencies undertaking the
regulation of functionally identical business activities, it is no wonder
that disparities in regulation exist. These disparities often result in ineffi-
cient and inequitable regulation and in some cases have undermined the
regulatory scheme. This section will highlight some of the more substan-
tial examples of the problem.
A. Taxes
Existing tax law discriminates between banks and securities firms
involved in identical securities activities. As a general rule, interest on
any indebtedness incurred to purchase or carry tax-exempt securities,
such as municipal bonds, is not deductible.47 Thus, day-to-day borrow-
ings by a dealer in tax-exempt securities to finance a position in such
securities would not generate deductible expenditures. Nevertheless,
banks may deduct the interest paid on short-term borrowings, the pro-
ceeds of which are used for the bank's day-to-day operations, which may
45. The SEC and the CFTC waged an intense struggle over which agency would have
jurisdiction over these contracts. Pursuant to the SEC-CFTC treaty, the SEC may disapprove
a futures contract on a stock market index if it is subject to manipulation. Once the SEC does
not disapprove it, however, the CFTC becomes the exclusive federal regulator of trading in
that contract. See Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2294 (amending
§ 2(a) of the Commodity Exchange Act); Act of Oct. 13, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-303, 96 Stat.
1409 (amending the 1934 Act).
46. Financial Institutions Restructuring and Services Act of 1981: Hearings Before the Sen-
ate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 890-91 (1981) (state-
ment of John S.R. Shad, Chairman, SEC).
47. 26 U.S.C. § 265(2) (1982).
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include dealing in tax-exempt securities such as municipal bonds. The
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) reasons that such interest expenses con-
stitute part of the ordinary business of a bank.48 Therefore, a bank can
utilize its traditional source of funds to carry tax-exempt securities, while
enjoying an interest deduction that is denied to non-bank dealers in tax-
exempt securities. While there is some debate as to just how much of an
advantage the tax laws confer on banks and the extent to which non-
bank dealers are disadvantaged by the discrimination, there is no doubt
that a disparity exists where one should not.
B. Advertising
Another disparity in regulation exists in bank advertising of broker-
age services. The advertising activities of broker-dealers are subject to
specific regulation by the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD) and by the SEC.4 9 Although banks are subject to the anti-fraud
provisions of the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act, as a practical matter, their
advertisements are not regulated because bank regulators do not gener-
ally review the advertising activities of banks."
C. Margin
The regulation of the extension of credit for securities purchases is
also very inequitable. Regulation T 1l prohibits brokers or dealers from
making loans to purchase or carry nonmarginable securities collateral-
ized by those securities. Regulation U,52 on the other hand, provides
that banks may extend credit on nonmarginable securities. Margin re-
quirements for options and futures also differ. While the margin level
required for options on stock market indices is now ten percent of the
underlying contract's value plus the current option premium, 53 there is
no federal margin level required for futures on stock market indices, even
though these futures and options contracts are functionally
indistinguishable.
5 4
48. Rev. Rul. 61-222, 1961-2 C.B. 58.
49. See, eg., Rule 206(4)-l, 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-i (1984) (under the Investment Advis-
ers Act); NASD Rules of Fair Practice, § 35 NASD MANUAL (CCH) 2195. The NASD rule
sets forth general standards for communications with the public, such as prohibiting exagger-
ated, unwarranted or misleading statements or claims, as well as specific standards regarding,
among other things, necessary data in advertisements, identification of sources of information,
claims and opinions, and offers of free services.
50. Note, A Banker's Adventure, supra note 1, at 1531.
51. 12 C.F.R. Part 220 (1984).
52. 12 C.F.R. Part 221 (1984).
53. Regulation T, 12 C.F.R. Part 220 (1984).
54. Indeed, absent an emergency, the CFTC is proscribed from even reviewing the futures
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D. Qualification of Personnel and Supervision
Persons involved in customer securities activities are subject to quite
different qualification and supervision requirements, depending on
whether they are affiliates of registered broker-dealers or banks. Section
15(b)(7) of the 1934 Act55 prohibits registered broker-dealers or persons
associated with registered broker-dealers from effecting transactions in
securities or inducing the purchase or sale of securities unless they meet
the NASD's standards for training, experience and competence. Pursu-
ant to this section, Schedule C of the NASD's bylaws requires all repre-
sentatives of a broker-dealer who supervise, solicit or conduct a securities
business to register with the NASD by passing its Series 7 examination. 6
The exam tests overall knowledge of the securities markets and the regu-
latory requirements applicable to broker-dealers.5 7 Thus, section 15(b)(7)
and the NASD's Series 7 examination requirement ensure that all repre-
sentatives of broker-dealers who solicit customers or effect transactions
in securities meet minimum qualification standards. Employees of banks
who engage in securities activities are not subject to any qualification or
testing requirements.
Section 15(b)(4)(E)"8 of the 1934 Act authorizes the Commission to
bring administrative actions against broker-dealers who fail reasonably to
supervise with a view to preventing violations of the securities laws.
Banks are not subject to similar administrative actions for failing reason-
ably to supervise the securities activities of their employees.
E. Insider Trading
Options and futures on stock market indices are also regulated dif-
ferently in the area of insider, trading. There are no prohibitions on in-
margins established by commodities exchanges. See § 8a(7)(C) of the Commodity Exchange
Act, 7 U.S.C. § 12a(7)(C) (1982). But see letter from Susan Phillips, Chairman, CFTC, to
Paul Volker, Chairman, Federal Reserve Board (Nov. 16, 1984) (The CFTC disagreed with a
number of the conclusions and suggestions contained in the Board's study. The CFTC ob-
jected to the suggestion that there be a federal agency oversight role in reviewing margin levels
established by boards of trade for stock index futures. It rejected the "level playing field"
concerns voiced by the Board as being empirically unproven. Because of the different func-
tions served by taking positions in futures and the underlying securities, the CFTC found that
there is no need for an equivalent margin for stock index future and stocks. Finally, the CFTC
disagreed with the suggestion made by the Board that the Board may have authority to set
margin requirements for stock index futures.).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(7) (1982).
56. NASD MANuAL (CCII) 1102A.
57. Id., NATIONAL Assoc. OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INc., STUDY OUTLINE (1983) (for
the SECO/NASD Non-member General Securities Examination).
58. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E) (1982).
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sider trading of futures on stock market indices, but options on stock
market indices are subject to the SEC's Rule lOb-5. 5 9
F. Investment Companies
Banks operating common and collective trusts and investment com-
panies regulated under the Investment Company Act operate under quite
different rules with respect to transactions involving potential conflicts of
interest. Banks acting as trustees are, of course, subject to the fiduciary
duties of trustees under state law. However, registered investment com-
panies are specifically regulated as to the kinds of transactions they may
enter into with affiliated entities. Section 10(fD 0 of the Investment Com-
pany Act and rules thereunder restrict the ability of investment compa-
nies to purchase securities in underwritten offerings in which their
affiliates are participating, and section 17(e)6 regulates commissions re-
ceived by broker affiliates in investment company transactions. In addi-
tion, section 17(a)62 of the Investment Company Act and rules
thereunder contain detailed prohibitions on transactions where conflicts
of interest may exist. Banks operating collective trusts are not subject to
these specific prohibitions.
G. Administrative Remedies
In an age of inter-industry competition, the present regulatory
framework may undermine the SEC's enforcement program.63 The vari-
ous securities laws give the SEC the power to revoke the registrations or
limit the activities of broker-dealers, investment companies, investment
advisors and persons associated with those entities.64 The SEC regularly
bars or suspends securities laws violators from association with broker-
dealers, investment companies and investment advisors. In today's
world, however, these sanctions may not have their intended effect-pro-
tecting the investing public by keeping such persons out of the securities
business. Individuals barred from association with these entities need
only become employed by the securities division of a bank or sell variable
59. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984).
60. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(f) (1982).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(e) (1982).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(a) (1982).
63. The enforcement program of other agencies may be undermined as well. Our com-
ments are limited to the effect of a framework of industry regulation on the SEC's enforcement
program only because of our familiarity with that program.
64. Sections 15(b)(4) and 15(b)(6) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(b)(4), 78o(b)(6)
(1982); § 8(b) of the Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8(b) (1982); and §§ 203(e) and
203(0 of the Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-3(e)-(f) (1982).
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annuities meeting Rule 151 (assuming it is adopted) in order to skirt the
SEC's sanctions.6" By doing so, they could continue to sell investment
instruments to the public. As a result, the SEC's administrative sanc-
tions would neither deter future violations, nor protect the public from
persons who have violated the law.
Similarly, the present regulatory scheme obviates the effect of in-
junctions obtained against further violations of the securities laws. In-
junctions do not restrict in any way the activities of persons who are
clever enough not to buy, sell or advise others with respect to stocks,
bonds, and other investment contracts. Thus, one subject to an order
enjoining him from further violations of Rule 10b-5 can act with impu-
nity in buying or selling, for example, futures on stock market indices. 66
V. PROPOSED SOLUTION
The disparities and inefficiencies highlighted above have led to a
number of legislative and administrative proposals for reform. Most re-
cently, the Bush Task Force has recommended legislation that would
eliminate some of the disparities in the present regulatory framework.
This section will analyze proposed solutions to some of these disparities,
including the SEC's proposed Rule 3b-9 under the 1934 Act, which
would require banks performing certain securities activities to register
with the SEC as broker-dealers.
6 7
As a result of the unequal regulation of the securities activities of
banks and registered broker-dealers, the Treasury Department has pro-
posed legislation that would require banks conducting certain securities
activities, such as underwriting public offerings, to conduct all of their
65. The SEC recently considered an enforcement recommendation against a registered
representative of a broker-dealer who had committed serious violations of the antifraud provi-
sions of the securities laws with respect to his customers' accounts. The broker-dealer fired
him upon learning of the violative conduct, but he was soon hired as a salesman for an insur-
ance company. Short of criminal sanctions, the SEC has no power to obtain an order that
affects his present activities.
66. Persons subject to injunctions against further violations of the antifraud provisions of
the federal securities laws are disqualified from registration with the CFTC. 17 C.F.R. § 3.20
(1984). Nevertheless, this disqualification would not effect, for example, someone who merely
traded in commodities. Section 1.01 of the Bylaws of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange pro-
vides that members of the exchange must be persons of good moral character, reputation and
business integrity. This subjective standard does not provide for automatic disqualification of
one subject to an injunction against further violations of the antifraud provisions of the federal
securities laws, but someone subject to such an injunction may be deemed to be a person not of
good moral character, reputation and business integrity. In such a case, the Chicago Mercan-
tile Exchange would have discretionary authority under its bylaws to deny such a person mem-
bership on the Exchange.
67. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-20,357 (Nov. 8, 1983).
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securities activities through affiliated entities as part of a holding com-
pany structure.6 The Treasury Department has stated that, among
other benefits, a mandatory holding company structure would insulate
depositories from the risks of securities activities.69 Such a requirement
would also prevent banks from gaining an unfair competitive advantage
by deducting the interest expense of carrying tax-exempt securities.70
The SEC has endorsed the Treasury Department's position. In fact,
in congressional testimony, the SEC advocated that all banks be required
to conduct all their securities activities through affiliates. 7' The Treasury
Department's holding company proposal holds the key to the realization
of a regulatory framework based on functional regulation. A full-service
financial firm operates under the jurisdiction of many state and federal
agencies. To prevent duplicative and overlapping regulation, a regulated
entity engaged in activities under the jurisdiction of different regulators
should conduct its activities through affiliates registered with the appro-
priate regulatory authority. For example, under such a regulatory
framework, the banking or insurance operations of a firm would be sub-
ject to regulation only by banking or insurance agencies, respectively,
and would not be subject to regulation by both. Moreover, if all affiliates
performing those activities were under the jurisdiction of a single agency,
functionally similar commercial activities could be subject to the same
regulations.
The pivotal role of the holding company concept is also apparent
from proposed rules of several agencies designed to further the concept of
functional regulation. Virtually all either utilize the holding company
concept or implicitly assume that regulated entities will conduct business
through a holding company or functionally distinct affiliates. For exam-
ple, the SEC's proposed Rule 3b-9 would require that certain bank secur-
ities activities be performed through broker-dealers registered under the
1934 Act, notwithstanding the fact that "banks," as defined in the 1934
Act, are presently excluded from the definitions of both "broker" and
"dealer." '72 The Commission's authority for this proposal is the pream-
ble to the definitional section of the 1934 Act, which provides that the
68. The Financial Institutions Deregulation Act, S. 1609, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
69. See Letter from Donald T. Regan, Secretary of the Treasury, to John S.R. Shad,
Chairman of the SEC (July 12, 1984) (commenting on the SEC's proposed Rule 3b-9).
70. Id.
71. See Securities Activities of Depository Institutions: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
28, 28-35 (1982) (statement of John S.R. Shad, Chairman of SEC, regarding the Treasury
Department's proposed Bank Holding Company Deregulation Act).
72. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-20, 357 (Nov. 8, 1983).
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stated definitions apply "unless the context otherwise requires. 73
Under proposed Rule 3b-9, the activities which banks would be re-
quired to conduct through registered broker-dealers are: (1) public solic-
itation of brokerage business; (2) receipt of transaction-related
compensation for providing brokerage services for trusts, managing
agencies or other accounts to which the bank provides advice; and
(3) dealing in or underwriting, on either a firm commitment or best ef-
forts basis, securities other than exempted or municipal securities.74 The
SEC proposed this rule in order to ensure adequate investor protection
and fair and orderly markets and to subject those engaging in similar
commercial activities to the same rules and regulations.
If the proposed rule were adopted, many of the disparities in the
present regulatory framework would be eliminated. A bank or bank affil-
iate registered as a broker-dealer would be subject to the same advertis-
ing, margin and supervision rules as other registered broker-dealers. The
bank's representatives would be subject to the same qualification require-
ments and would be obligated to conduct their business in accordance
with the same just and equitable principles of trade. In addition, if the
bank were required to spin off the securities services business to an affili-
ate, the tax advantage enjoyed by banks dealing in tax-exempt securities
would be eliminated. Finally, SEC administrative orders suspending or
barring individuals from association with regulated entities would more
closely achieve their goals. Because Rule 3b-9 would require certain se-
curities services of banks to be conducted through an SEC-regulated en-
tity, a person barred or suspended from association with an SEC-
regulated entity could not frustrate the purposes of the sanction by enter-
ing the securities industry through a bank.
The proposed rule has, however, been widely criticized. Because the
rule does not explicitly require banks to conduct securities activities
through affiliates, banks and bank regulators have argued that the pro-
posed rule could subject banks to overlapping regulation by both the
SEC and bank regulatory agencies. The commentators point out that if
banks use subsidiaries or affiliates to conduct their securities activities,
they could be subject to SEC inspections of not only their securities activ-
ities, but also of their entire banking operations.75 Moreover, it has been
73. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (1982). This Article will not discuss the SEC's authority to adopt
Rule 3b-9. That subject has been one of great interest to those commenting upon the proposed
rule. See, eg., UNITED STATES DEPr. OF JUSTICE, COMMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES DE-
PARTMENT OF JUSTICE (Dec. 30, 1983) (regarding Proposed Rule 3b-9).
74. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 34-20, 357 (Nov. 8, 1983).
75. Section 17(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78q(b) (1982), authorizes the SEC to con-
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noted that certain broker-dealer regulations, such as the net capital
rule,76 would be virtually impossible for a bank to satisfy.
77
The SEC has noted expressly that Rule 3b-9 is not designed to regu-
late the non-securities activities of banks. Those activities would not be
subject to SEC review.7" In any event, the solution to this problem, if
indeed it is a problem, is for banks conducting securities activities that
require registration with the SEC to do so through an affiliate or subsidi-
ary and register only the affiliate or subsidiary.7 9 In that case, the pro-
posed rule would not create a system of overlapping regulation, but
instead would advance the cause of functional regulation by subjecting
similar commercial activity, regardless of who conducts it, to a uniform
regulatory scheme.
The FDIC has tacitly joined the SEC and the Treasury Department
in moving toward functional regulation through the holding company
concept. The FDIC recently approved final regulations that would re-
quire certain securities activities of insured non-member banks to be con-
ducted through bonafide subsidiaries or affiliates.80 The regulations
require subsidiaries to be adequately capitalized and physically separate
in their operations, including having a separate entrance. Without pass-
ing judgment on the FDIC's regulations as a whole, we applaud the "af-
filiate or subsidiary" requirement in the rule. It is consistent with the
holding company concept underlying both the Treasury Department's
proposed legislation and the SEC's proposed Rule 3b-9.
The FDIC regulations also properly impose stricter regulation on
subsidiaries than on affiliates. For example, unless a subsidiary is a
"qualified underwriter,"8 " it may underwrite only "investment quality
duct inspections of "all records" of registered brokers or dealers. Thus, all records of a bank
registered as a broker-dealer would be subject to SEC inspections.
76. Rule 15c3-1 of the 1934 Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (1984).
77. Rule 15c3-1, the net capital rule, requires registered broker-dealers to maintain a net
capital to liabilities ratio of roughly 1 to 15. Id. Banks are generally more highly levreaged
than that.
78. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 34-20,357 (Nov. 8, 1983) ('The Commission is not
seeking to regulate the non-securities activities of banks.").
79. Id. ("While the Commission is not proposing to prescribe any particular structure, it
believes the use by banks of separate securities affiliates or subsidiaries would minimize the
impact on banks of broker-dealer registration. .. ").
80. 49 Fed. Reg. 46709 (1984) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. Part 337).
81. The regulations define the term "qualified underwriter" as:
(1) Membership in good standing in the National Association of Securities Dealers
("NASD"), (2) continuous operation for the five year period preceding notice to
FDIC as required by this part, (3) no officer, director, general partner, employee, or
10 percent shareholder of any class of voting securities of the subsidiary has been
convicted within five years of the notice required by this part of any felony or misde-
meanor in connection with the purchase or sale of any security, involving the making
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debt" and "investment quality equity" securities. Among the conditions
for becoming a "qualified underwriter" are membership in good standing
with the NASD and the absence of judgments against the subsidiary or
its officers, directors and major stockholders for violations of the securi-
ties laws. A securities subsidiary may be a more immediate threat to the
financial stability of its parent bank than a securities affiliate, especially if
the bank has a significant amount of its capital invested in the subsidiary.
Moreover, it is easier to insulate by regulation an affiliate from the liabili-
ties of its sister companies than it is a parent from the activities of its
subsidiaries. Thus, a subsidiary should be subject to stricter regulations
in the interest of insuring the safety and soundness of the parent bank.
On April 16, 1984, the OCC proposed a rule82 that would allow
national banks to conduct certain brokerage activities only through oper-
ating subsidiaries registered with the SEC. The proposed rule would re-
quire national banks to conduct discount brokerage activities through a
subsidiary if: (1) a bank made margin loans to its brokerage customers;
(2) a bank held customer securities other than as an introducing broker
on a fully-disclosed basis; or (3) a bank provided retail customers with
"individualized" investment advice together with brokerage services, for
which a separate, transaction-related fee was charged. Although there
are some differences between OCC's proposed rule and the SEC's pro-
posed Rule 3b-9 with respect to the activities that would require registra-
tion with the SEC,13 the OCC's proposed rule is consistent with the
of a false filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission, or arising out of the
conduct of the business of an underwriter, broker, dealer, municipal securities dealer,
or investment adviser, (4) neither the subsidiary nor any of its directors, officers,
general partners, employees, or 10 percent shareholders of any class of voting securi-
ties of the subsidiary is subject to any state or federal administrative order or court
order, judgment, or decree entered within five years of the notice required by this
part temporarily or preliminarily enjoining or restraining such person or the subsidi-
ary from engaging in, or continuing, any conduct or practice in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security involving the making of a false filing with the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, or arising out of the conduct of the business of an
underwriter, broker, dealer, municipal securities dealer, or investment adviser,
(5) none of the subsidiary's directors, officers, general partners, employees, or 10
percent shareholders are subject to an order entered within five years of the notice
required by this part of the Securities and Exchange Commission entered pursuant to
section 15(b) or 15B(c) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78, 780-4)
or section 203(c) or (f) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-3(c),
(f)), and (6) all officers of the subsidiary who have supervisory responsibility for un-
derwriting activities have at least five years experience in similar activities at NASD
member securities firms.
Id. at 46713-14.
82. 49 Fed. Reg. 15089 (1984) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. Parts 5 and 12).
83. For example, a bank would be required to register as a broker-dealer under proposed
Rule 3b-9 if it engaged in order-taking discount brokerage activities. The OCC's proposed rule
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holding company concept and thus a major step forward toward func-
tional regulation.
In at least one respect, however, the OCC's proposed rule does not
go far enough. The OCC would continue to regulate the securities sub-
sidiary, even though the subsidiary is regulated by the SEC. As a result,
the subsidiary would be subject to overlapping regulation. The solution
to this problem is a legislative one: to require that banks spin off the
securities activities to an affiliate, whose activities by law would be insu-
lated from the bank. Affiliates' securities business would be less likely to
threaten the safety and soundness of the banks, and there would be no
need for oversight by the OCC to assert its jurisdiction.
The Bush Task Force has recommended that the registration re-
quirements of the 1933 Act be made appliable to publicly offered securi-
ties of banks and thrifts and that 1934 Act requirements for bank and
thrift securities be transferred to the SEC.14  These recommendations
would eliminate the obviously irrational disparity that exists today where
registration and periodic reporting requirements for banks or thrifts are
administered by bank or thrift regulators, but the same requirements for
bank holding companies-whose only asset may be the stock of a bank or
thrift-are regulated by the SEC. The Bush Task Force should be ap-
plauded for these recommendations.
Ironically, though, the Bush Task Force abandons the functional
regulation concept in recommending that the FHLBB continue to exer-
cise securities jurisdiction over conversions of savings and loan associa-
tions and savings banks from mutual to stock form. The Bush Task
Force suggests that the conversion of a thrift is a matter "involving the
safety and soundness of insured institutions." 6 Although the financial
safety of a thrift may theoretically be at risk in a conversion,8 7 it seems to
us that the principal public policy concern in a conversion, as in virtually
would allow order taking by a department of a bank as long as the bank introduces and for-
wards all transactions and accounts on a fully disclosed basis to a broker-dealer for execution.
84. BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM, supra note 2, at 91-92.
85. Id. at 91.
86. Id.
87. The Task Group seems to suggest that the conversion of a thrift is a matter "involving
the safety and soundness of insured institutions." BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM, supra note 2, at
91. Nevertheless, the Task Group identifies no special regulatory concerns involved in such a
conversion. Its report argues only that regulatory concerns exist when a thrift issues mort-
gage-backed securities, and the mortgages backing the securities are a significant portion of the
thrift's assets. Id. at 93. Issuance of mortgage-backed securities does, indeed, implicate the
safety and soundness of insured institutions, but, in our view, this point is irrelevant to conver-




all public offerings, is full disclosure of material facts to the investors.
For this reason, and because SEC jurisdiction over all public offerings is
consistent with the concept of functional regulation, the Bush Task
Force should have recommended that the SEC have jurisdiction over
conversions of thrifts.
The Bush Task Force noted that most of its members felt that the
remaining margin responsibilities should be eliminated.18 More recently,
the FRB has recommended that federal margin regulation be eliminated
entirely. 9 Securities self-regulatory organizations, such as the stock ex-
changes and the NASD, would then be responsible for setting margin
regulations. If the FRB's proposal were enacted into law, the current
disparity between margin requirements for options and futures on stock
market indices could be eliminated.
The Bush Task Force's recommendations, the Treasury Depart-
ment's proposed holding company requirement for financial institutions,
the SEC's proposed Rule 3b-9, the OCC's proposed rule and the FDIC's
regulations are important first steps toward the creation of more efficient
and fair regulatory format for financial institutions. In an age where we
are all witnessing the breakdown of industry barriers and mergers and
acquisitions designed to allow financial conglomerates to provide a full
range of financial services, these proposed rules would allow firms to
compete fairly against one another and allow regulators to focus their
efforts on areas in which they have expertise. The beneficiary on both
counts will be the public.
VI. LOOKING AHEAD
The proposals discussed above will help achieve the goals of func-
tional regulation. These proposals will "level the playing field" between
banks and securities firms and protect the investing public by requiring
all those soliciting securities business from the public to abide by SEC
regulations which were designed to protect the public. Nevertheless, the
concept of functional regulation has not been discussed as a remedy for
regulatory disparities beyond those that exist between banking and secur-
ities firms regarding the solicitation of securities.
For example, as noted above, disparities exist in both the regulation
of futures and options on stock market indices and in the regulation of
dealers in those markets. Nevertheless, futures and options on stock
88. BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM, supra note 2, at 93-94.
89. See Murray & McMurray, Fed Urges Congress to Ends Its Role in Setting Securities
Margin Rule, Wall St. J., Jan. 15, 1985, at 3, col. 2-3 (western edition).
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market indices perform the same economic function. This disparity
should be eliminated by requiring that all derivative products on securi-
ties be regulated by the SEC. Although there are enormous political ob-
stacles to such a proposal, it is not our intention to reopen recently
healed wounds between the SEC and CFTC.90 As an abstract proposi-
tion, these virtually identical products should be subject to the same
regulations.
Although we support the thrust of the OCC's proposed rule requir-
ing banks to conduct certain securities activities through subsidiaries, we
would go further. The OCC might consider promulgating, or Congress
might consider passing a statute requiring that banks administer collec-
tive investment funds of all types through subsidiaries or affiliates. Each
collective fund would then be registered under the Investment Company
Act, and the subsidiary or affiliate could register with the SEC as an
investment adviser. Investment companies and collective funds would
then be subject to a uniform regulatory scheme for their functionally sim-
ilar commercial activity.
Another area where the concept of functional regulation can be uti-
lized profitably is insurance. Hybrid insurance/investment products
such as certain variable annuities and their progency, single premium
deferred annuities, should be regulated by the SEC if they place a signifi-
cant investment risk on the investor. Such instruments appear to be
more than just insurance products. 91 The goal of functional regulation
will be served if instruments serving the same economic purpose as secur-
ities, such as variable annuities and single premium deferred annuities,
are subject to the same rules and regulations.
Unfortunately, the SEC's decision to publish for comment proposed
Rule 15192 is inconsistent with its stated desire to create a framework of
90. See supra note 45.
91. SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959) (Brennan, J., concurring).
The Court in Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. stated:
At the core of the 1933 Act are the requirements of a registration statement and
prospectus to be used in connection with the issuance of "securities". ... The
emphasis is on disclosure; the philosophy of the Act is that full disclosure of the
details of the enterprise in which the investor is to put his money should be made so
that he can intelligently appraise the risks involved.
The regulation of life insurance and annuities by the States ... proceeds, on
entirely different principles .... The system does not depend on disclosure ....
[The] congressional division of regulatory functions is rational and purposeful in
the case of a traditional life insurance or annuity policy, where the obligations of the
company were measured in fixed-dollar terms and where the investor could not be
said, in any meaningful sense, to be a sharer in the investment experience of the
company.
Id. at 76-78.
92. SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-6558 (Nov. 21, 1984).
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functional regulation. Both the investing public and the goal of efficient
regulation may suffer as a result. The proper application of functional
regulation would limit the exclusion in section 3(a)(8) of the 1933 Act to
securities in which the difference between the guaranteed interest and the
discretionary interest is a de minimis one. Such a rule would properly
distinguish between insurance products, in which the obligations of the
insurance company are in fixed-dollar terms, and investment products, in
which the investor is to share in profits or losses according to the invest-
ment experience of the company.
One final area in which the concept of functional regulation can be
profitably pursued is periodic reporting. The SEC's integrated disclosure
program has paved the way for EDGAR, presently a pilot program for
electronic filing of periodic reports under the 1934 Act.93 With the inau-
guration of EDGAR, it is not difficult to imagine the day in which all
registration statements, periodic reports and proxy statements are trans-
mitted electronically to the SEC and stored by computers. Similarly, it is
just as easy to imagine the day when insurance companies, banks and
thrifts will file reports electronically with their state and federal regula-
tors. Finally, it is not unlikely that, to the extent these reports are public,
one agency will have electronic access to reports filed with other
agencies.
Electronic filing of reports presents new opportunities to create an
inter-disciplinary regulatory framework based on the function of the
product or service offered. The SEC, for example, recently proposed a
rule that would require publicly held property and casualty insurance
companies to include, with periodic reports fied with the SEC, portions
of reports filed with state insurance commissioners.94 In addition, the
Bush Task Force has recommended that bank holding companies be able
to fulfill their periodic reporting requirements to all regulators by filing
copies of their Forms 10-K and 10-Q, which are presently filed with the
SEC.95
These developments foreshadow the utilization of the concept of in-
93. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-6540 (June 27, 1984); SEC Securities Act Re-
lease No. 33-6539 (June 27, 1984).
94. SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-6559 (Nov. 27, 1984). Currently, § 7(c)(1) of the
1934 Act provides that registered clearing agencies, transfer agents and municipal securities
dealers that are regulated by banking regulatory agencies shall file copies of their SEC reports
with the appropriate banking regulatory agency. 15 U.S.C. § 78q(c)(1) (1982). In addition,
§§ 17(c)(2) and (3) roughly provide for exchanges of information and coordinated action be-
tween agencies. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78q(c)(2)-(3) (1982). These statutory provisions also suggest the
possibilities for incorporation by reference on an interagency basis.
95. BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM, supra note 2, at 91.
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corporation by reference on an interagency basis. Once electronic filing
of reports is in place, it should be possible to send parts of reports to
various agencies that might request them. For example, a publicly held
insurance company might file electronically a report with a state insur-
ance commission and also file electronically a portion of that report with
the SEC. Moreover, to the extent that agencies can work together and
that the Treasury Department's holding company legislation becomes
law, it should be possible to tailor periodic reports of financial conglom-
erates so that the reports of affiliates can be fied separately with agencies
having jurisdiction over particular functions and then assemble those re-
ports for filing with the agency or agencies having jurisdiction over the
entire holding company.96
Take the case of Sears, Roebuck & Co., for example, which owns an
insurance company, Allstate, and a broker-dealer, Dean Witter. Each
affiliate should be able to fie reports separately with the respective insur-
ance or securities agency and then assemble those reports, together with
financial statements and narrative discussions of other Sears lines of busi-
nesses, when preparing periodic reports to be filed with the SEC.
Although this scenario assumes, among other things, major advances to-
ward uniformity in accounting methods for different industries, elec-
tronic filing of reports and incorporation by reference of those reports on
an interagency basis are worthwhile and practical objectives.
VII. CONCLUSION
Functional regulation is a worthy goal presently being pursued in a
narrow context. Disparities in regulation exist which make competition
unfair, frustrate administrative sanctions designed to protect the public
interest and, in some cases, burden private enterprise unnecessarily. Pro-
posals have been made to remedy some of these disparities, and we en-
dorse these proposals. At their core is the Treasury Department's
proposed legislation to require functionally distinct activities to be con-
ducted through affiliated entities as part of a holding company structure.
Such proposals move in the right direction toward improving the regula-
tory framework of the financial services industry. It is time now to step
back from the existing debate and consider the broader applicability of
functional regulation in the present technological environment.
96. At the SEC at least, the regulations necessary for such a composite reporting system
are to some extent in place. The Form 10-K annual report requires registrants to disclose
financial information for each of its industry segments. Regulation S-K, Item 101(b) and (c).
Of course, these regulations would be amended to allow the incorporation by reference of
reports filed with other agencies.
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